Fallen Empire of Liberal Metamodernism

Part 5 of a multipart series, “How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity” This article series is for economic reformers and political activists interested in the metamodern political movement. This series will undoubtedly find appeal with those who have come to understand that the current values which drive global economy, those which we call liberal, are obstructing solutions to contemporary political challenges — in as much, those values are unable to guide a common activity beyond. Admittedly, the prescriptions herein are likely a mere articulation of what is intuitively felt across a large demographic — certainly those who have found themselves gravitating toward contemporary nationalist solutions. Undoubtedly a bit of political agnosticism is required for digesting this series. Already now, the final recommendation can be teased. If we wish to nurture truth and authenticity then we require an economy championed under the banner of prefigurativism.

Political sarcasm
Lyrical self-deprecation
Idolization of the apathetic and the cool
What conditions allow for the enjoyment of such aesthetics?
From the vantage of present time, it is undeniable that the sarcastic themes present in the comedy of George Carlin, John Stewart, and South Park have become transparent. Equally, the self-deprecation of Radio Head and Nine Inch Nails has not aged well. We can say something similar for the apathetic character of Donn Pearce’s Cool Hand Luke and Marshall Mathers’ Eminem. Undoubtedly, the popularity of the entertainment of the late second millennium indicates a spirit coping with the symptoms of the giantism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The name postmodernist has been used to described these works. However, it must be admitted that this name is only partially appropriate. This aesthetic does not so much celebrate a rejection of the ideals of later modernization, as it does romanticize the suffering from with them. The spirit of postmodernism indicates a deep commitment to the pursuit of modernization — but at the same time recognizes this pursuit had realized in a perversion. Simply consider the idolization of the industrialization of knowledge throughout the scientific industries and journalism, but then also the distrust toward authority, deep state conspiracy, and the appeal of populism. Looking at the early third millennium, we see the appearance of the conservative skeptic — one who doubted the corona virus data reported by the mainstream news. We can assume this is the same skeptical spirit which took up flat earth theory in order to redeem the individual’s own personal experience. If we say that Gene Roddenberry’s Star Trek is the most pronounced expression of modernization and imperial value in science fiction, then Chris Carter’s X-Files must be the postmodern sequel.

Now, what might strike us as peculiar is that this twofold aesthetic periodization — the modern and postmodern — had been prepared for long ago. Already at the inception of the epistemological project, during the seventeenth century, Descartes’ meditations provide a wealth of material for science fiction novelists of the twentieth. Already then, the rationalist subjectification of the world had been coupled with solipsism. No doubt, the insurmountable chasm which opened between the subject and his world had prepared for a primordial encounter with the uncanny. This tripartite unfolding of doubt, rationalism, and science fiction may today strike us just as uncanny as the estrangement itself. In recalling Descartes’ second meditation we remember his reflection as he sat isolated in his apartment,

“…what do I see from my window, but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men…”

“And in regard to any corporeal objects, I do not recognize in them anything so great or so excellent that they might not have possibly proceeded from myself…to these it is certainly not necessary that I should attribute any author other than myself…”

From the vantage afforded us today, it is hard to imagine any other conclusion to Descartes’ rationalist subjectification of the world than postmodern suffering. After all, anyone who has come to understand himself as the rationalist’s metaphysical subject and who, at the same time, idolizes a totalization of the universal powers, will eventually realize that even if this totality could be completed he would find himself a mere peripheral within a strange machinery. And anyone who then, at the same time, had come to experience the Death of God would find himself alone in a world of cold mechanisms beyond his comprehension — a machinery which had no concern for his interest. And while Immanuel Kant’s epistemological project is said to have improved upon Descartes’, despite all his excruciating detail, we were left without a story of how a metaphysical subject transcends its own subjectivity in order to meet another subject — a story which might bring a me into contact with a you. Of course, looking into our historical continuum, this solipsism did not go unacknowledged in the years following Kant. However, the problematizing of subjectivity hadn’t become explicit until the beginning of the twentieth century. Not until the writing of Edmund Husserl do we find an explicit problematizing of what can be called intersubjective transcendence. And still, over the next several decades following Husserl’s pronouncement, the problem of intersubjective transcendence went unsolved, such that we inherit it today.

Now, this article, part 5 in a multipart series on nurturing truth and authenticity, has been titled Fallen Empire of Liberal Metamodernism. It is here that our historical narrative of the economy of truth announces the conclusion to episteme. However, the catalyst for this fall should not be confused. Neither subjectivity nor intersubjective transcendence is that which has signaled a confrontation with episteme, such that we desire resolve. And in all honesty, if the problems of the primordial actio of episteme were merely of consequence to intellectualism, we would not find reason for economic reform prescriptions. However, we can be sure this is not the case. After all, it is not by way of Husserl’s deliberations that we inherit the epistemological foundations of modernization today. To this we must admit a completely unintellectual source. It is, after all, by way of World War II and the victory of Enlightenment values that we suffer from the symptoms of episteme today. While this claim may be discomforting to those who champion for the universal ideal of Human Rights, at the same time, there should be little surprise. There can be no doubt that the name liberalism is printed upon every banner of imperialism today. However, if we are to defend such a claim, we must temporarily set aside the historical economy of truth. Of course, a comprehensive understanding of liberalism could only be gained from outside this Warden Post article series, yet a shallow qualification of liberalism is required before we can return to truth — before truth’s utility within this project can be made clear. The next few paragraphs will make bare the project of liberalism as one toward a liberation from governance.
In looking back to the works of the philosophers and statements of the Enlightenment, we find a project to liberate the vessel of human potential, the tabula rasa — John Locke’s “white paper” — that blank canvas which is the human subject. Liberalism began as an application of the epistemologist’s metaphysical subject to the domain of governance. Liberalism promised liberation by way of the rights of this subject. Inalienable Rights once referred to a purely metaphysical or ‘mental’ category — those of the subject’s internal freedom. No matter what earthly rule any man found himself under, his inner world was a realm which was his own. Today we might think of this as merely a slave’s freedom. But as a pre-physical category, these rights were absolutely inalienable.

Within Enlightenment literature we find that these Inalienable Right transformed into something thoroughly epistemological — that is, as an embodiment of the epistemological comportment toward the phenomena of experience. Here, we find an application of these rights to the domain of social and material economy. Natural Rights were those of a man’s economy — those to be guarded from exploitation by any earthly powers. Natural Rights were to be secured through law. The legislative state a vehicle for such governance-as-law. In 1802 Thomas Jefferson penned a now historical letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut. In this letter we find the kernel of what would later become a foundational mantra of the liberal project — the separation of church and state. When we learn of this separation at a young age we are likely to think of the hocus pocus of religion and the powers of governance. The blessing of the tsar by the priest. The consultation of oracles before going to war. Yet, any primordial reckoning which these fanciful images provoke fades beyond the playground imagination. Even a staunch rejection of such magic signals immaturity. Instead, what calls for reckoning today is the function which each half serves in the whole of the dichotomy. We surmise that the functional division must have been clear in Jefferson’s mind — a separation of action over-and-above belief,

“Believing that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’, thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.”

In looking at our historical record we understand the foundation for this wall had been trenched long before Jefferson’s pronouncement; yet, its popularity signals a utility. In as much as governance-as-law regulates, it curates, and develops fair exchanges in the economy of man, Jefferson’s separation animates a spirit of mercantilism. This animation is in favor of other activities for governance — such as, for example, toward any good in-itself. Yet, we must also admit that this liberation does not entirely free the soul of man. If we are highly inhuman, we can even explain liberalism as a mere rationalization for the sake of productivity. After all, from the perspective of mercantilism, even liberalism itself is a mere rationalization which has granted expediency to productivity — the businessman the mere vessel. And in looking at later testimony, this separation had led to a common critique against mercantilism. In 2013, James Gustave Speth, the US advisor on climate change, championed for a spiritual renewal. He warned of a disintegration of morality from within this economy. “Greed, selfishness, and apathy” were causing destruction to nature. But today, with a bit of distance to the disgust, we can ask ourselves, where else was the creative self-authoring spirit supposed to find satisfaction within market economy? When the value of a product is determined by the market, the individual creator is forced to look towards his activity, his busyness, as the object of his own value. It should be no surprise that career success became the barometer of anyone’s contribution to his people. The entertainment industries pandered to Enlightenment values. Friedrich Nietzsche’s “What doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger” was repeated to this end — satisfying that spirit which idolizes individual strength and self-reliance. Residue from Enlightenment Reason and Will.
Now, there can be no doubt, liberalism’s mercantilism has announced itself as a preservation of episteme, in part, in the wake of the economic policy following WWII — including any restraints which fell together with the USSR. From the vantage of the here and now of today, we find ourselves resonate with those stories which tell of a liberation for a global market. Here we feel that even the wholeheartedly touted multiculturalismdiversity, and tolerance are in service to global market economics. Each ‘good’ only in as much as it services international market expansion, such that the legislative state had become a mere auxiliary. Taking the words of French philosopher Étienne Balibar as testimony from this period, we understand that the legislative state had devolved “from a protective function to a function of destruction of its own civil society.” A destruction “not in the ‘totalitarian’ form, but in the ‘utilitarian’ form, which is hardly less violent”. And although these passages are reproduced here by way of his essay, Our European Incapacity, it is not hard for us to extend this to any state subjected to federal structure in service to market demands. Of course, we should not be surprised that by way of liberal economic policy, commerce would take advantage — and in doing so established an expectation: that business would be invested with the task of moral value execution and maintenance. Following the death of George Floyd this narrative seems justified. In a liberation from governance, private enterprise is able to satisfy public interests more than any church or government institution.
Presented over to the resonance which accompanies these words, we can bring this story into our own. Liberalism’s social governance manifested by way of market economics only shelters and preserves the epistemological comportment toward the phenomena of experience. Liberalism, cannot defeat tyranny — whether that of authoritarianism, it’s fascist manifestations, or totalitarian. Instead, it is precisely by way of social governance and market economics that the primordial actio of over-standing is preserved. Presented with these conclusions, we must admit that any form of liberalism’s governance-as-law, whether by way of government administration or social governance by way of market economy, makes man subordinate before the law — each man equal to another. Yet, we are equally aware of the deficiency. As an embodiment of legislation, surveillance, and punishment governance-as-law has neglected exactly what the church meant to satisfy in the whole of human economy. Inspiration. Hope. Communion. We should not be surprised to find champions for nationalism accompanying those for liberation — which, even if utterly regressive, seek refuge in a space for truth altogether outside of the violence of market value creation.
Standing here, in this very moment, the conclusions of episteme, as the guiding actio of modernization, have become transparent. Episteme lays bare naked for everyone to see. The liminal here and now of today is characterized by the very identification of this narrative. A question. Can anyone bear this visage? Who among us could continue down this path? No doubt, this article series is for those who are provoked to reconcile with this picture. From this position we find the emergence of a future project. The completion of which can only be signaled in a resolve to the alienation, estrangement, and apathy which we have inherited by way of the imperialism, totalitarianism, universalism, and giantism of episteme. Of course, this work is just one component in this initiative. And it is guided by merely two objects — truth and authenticity. Yet, these two objects are of paramount importance to the resolve. Nurturing either requires laying a foundation. And this foundation requires, firstly, that we redeem truth from the epistemological paradigm — rescuing it from rationality, empiricism, and liberalism — such that authenticity may be liberated. This task alone defines this work. In as much, we return to our object, truth. We must follow it through this postwar storyline. In concluding this narrative, we will have accomplished the first half of this article series — namely, the historical economy of truth. This concluding chapter is necessary, after all, it is precisely from within liberalism that we find that seemingly universal public concern for relativism — a worldview consequent of this project and, at the same time, at-odds with our primordial experience of truth. Only here will we find peace with liberalism, such that the emergent project can go forward, fully aware that epistemology has completed its primary task. Reason over any King. Before any God.

If we then turn our attention to the intellectual debate following WWII, we find a prioritization of disarming and depowering world institutions — even those far beyond the reach of the Nuremburg trials. The intellectuals who deconstructed authoritarianism during this period enjoyed public celebrity. These thinkers were invested with the burdensome task of reconciling with that metaphysical object which had been inherited by way of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. However, this task only signals a quite unfortunately narrative for the object power. The weaponizing of atomic energy had not brought an end to this paradigm. Instead, the imperialism of liberalism internalized upon itself. We can epitomize this period by reference to the debate surrounding intellectuals such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida, among others. In a little-referenced academic paper from 2003 titled The Problem of Critique, Steven M. Feldman identifies this turn away from epistemological metaphysics and toward a certain epistemological sociology by the name metamodernism.

“Metamodernism not only rejects epistemological foundationalism, but further dismisses these concerns as insignificant in comparison to other more pressing issues. Metamodernists tend to emphasize the operation and orientation of power.”

“Jürgen Habermas, for instance, unequivocally declares himself to be postmetaphysical.”

Though, this turn towards the project of a deconstruction of authority was not entirely healthy for liberalism. After all, as part of the deconstruction we find a commitment to abandoning epistemological fundamentalism — an idea ushered in by way of Martin Heidegger. In its place, these metamodernists adopted something of a socially conditioned understanding of the metaphysical subject — a social condition which Gadamer called “tradition”. However, in abandoning the solely accountable epistemological metaphysical subject, these metamodernists found themselves in the middle of a paradox. Feldman framed this paradox as the problematizing of critique within the metamodern paradigm. That is,

“If we are always situated in a communal or cultural context, then how can we criticize either a particular interpretation of a text or, more broadly, a societal arrangement or organization?”

That is, if there is no objectivized ruler of the standard then “metamodernism problematizes critique”. And this problem “leads us into the political conundrum”. But what is exactly this political conundrum which Feldman announces? — well, nothing other than the problem of liberalism, outright. If all interpretation and understanding is not only affirmed and valid, but celebrated, and at the same time, conditioned by a tradition beyond the accountability of any individual, then how do we integrate into cooperative activity? How do we constructively build a thoroughly liberal and now globalizing society? What is the one-and-only liberal narrative?
This is a question which can be answer by looking roughly fifteen years past Feldman’s announcement of the problem. It is here that we find metamodernism fully realized as the political movement. In 2017, Daniel Görtz and Emil Ejner Friss’s Scandinavian school of political metamodernism continued the sociological tradition by way of adult development theorists Ken Wilber, Michael Commons, Don Beck, Chris Cowan and the like. Their book, The Listening Society, addresses the problem of liberalism explicitly; in as much, they inexplicitly address the problematizing of critique. Their solution? — what could be called social value periodization. The Scandinavians understand that humans throughout the ages have met each other with common challenges. Those challenges, then, are something of a social challenge. In response, social values realize in order to mobilize solutions. In looking through the history of modernization, these social values can be mapped as a progressive journey — one which facilitates modernization itself. Of those value systems, metamodern is the most progressive, having succeeded both the modern and postmodern, which themselves have succeeded the Faustian values of pre-modern time, etcetera. No doubt, one of the most affirmative quality of the metamodern narrative is that it delivers out of the postmodern aesthetic.
In as much as the Scandinavian solution is developmental, we can say that the Scandinavian solution to the problematizing of critique is teleological. After all, social values which mobilize a people to overcome their challenges are healthy; however, those same values are unhealthy if they retard solutions to the next generation’s challenges. With such a social-developmental theory in hand, we are then able to both critique and affirm each local world narrative. Liberalism and the problem of critique is solved by way of teleology. However, what should be plainly obvious is that teleology does not so much resolve relativism. Instead, it simply falls under the age-old ideal of progress. Progress is esteemed as the 3rd-party ruler by which we measure and judge the truth. It could be said that truth, in the metamodern narrative, is subjected to something of a teleological relativism. To be sure, the Scandinavians admit as much. Metamodern truths are not the final stop. Those truths are provisional, merely the best we have. And as always, there is a certain nihilism lurking in the halls of relativism. It might be wise to remember the discontents which relativism had previously produced. We only need to recall Arthur van den Bruck’s discontents with liberal nihilism — those which, utterly premature, came under the perversion of Nazi imperialism. And yet, the nihilism of relativity might be the softer critique compared to the charge of imperialism.
No doubt, from Hegel and Marx, to Habermas, as well as Wilbur and the Integralists, the metaphysical subject of the epistemic tradition speaks from the position of the omniscient world observer. This list is indicative of the inauthentic object of which the omniscient world observer treats — historical humanity and his societies. And yet today, standing here in this “time between worlds”, the object of this scientist, his society, has revealed itself as a phantom. After all, where is the phenomena to which this object refers? When we draw our circle and proclaim, “society!” what have we captured? Society does not declare some physical object — a mass of material bodies. After all, you could remove any particular you or me from the consideration, and it might still be there. The object is atemporal or aspatial, even if that society falls within a certain time period and place. So what then is the function of that object — society — in our discourse? Within the social justice movements of the early third millennium, we find this object touted for the sake of a domestication of the human animal. It is here, in this relationship between the omniscient world observer and his object society that we discover the actio of the epistemological sociologist. Of course, it should go without saying that before we could heed to such domestication by way of this observer, we must clarify what society any domestication of the human animal is after — such that we could understand that domestication as either belonging to our project at hand, or a hinderance to a liberation of truth and authenticity.

In as much the Scandinavians take up sociology, and with it the position of the omniscient world observer, we should not be surprised that their solution equally has a taste of universal imperium. The Scandinavians appeal to something of a metamodern aristocracy — an exceptionally progressive group which can hand-guide the world to global governance. While this aristocracy was undoubtedly a device use for rallying their cause, this appeal also holds a toxic approach to life — one which promotes the position of the omniscient observer above the ‘subjective truthers’. On this account there is an apparent antagonism between the ‘every man’s philosophy’ and the Scandinavian’s marketing. Here it might be wise to take heed of Martin Luther King Jr.’s critique of the epistemic project, its totalitarianism and imperialism, when he remarked that from within Hegel’s “exposition of the coming to be of knowledge”, “the many are subsumed to the one”. Of course, none of this is to say that the Scandinavian’s appeal to teleological relativism is irrational. After all, the disclosure of any relative truth worldview realizes when the spirit of ‘getting along’ surpasses the spirit for authentic disclosure. If we understand that the global crises are, in fact, the crises of the future, then our efforts today, if they are going to have any meaning whatsoever, must mobilize a globally coordinated project. What should be considered then is whether we believe the global is that which will inspire solutions in the emergent project — namely to alienation, estrangement, and apathy. The symptoms which address the ‘getting along’ which their coordination requires.

Of course, no one can yet can answer or decide which horizons will afford answers in the emergent project. Likely the best we can do is revert to our own instincts. No doubt, each of us has the ability to turn toward our inner space and ask, in all honest, if we believe that our future challenges can be solved by way of an idolization of objects such as the globalhumanity. In taking up such an exercise, we should be mindful that these universals are spoken to from a spirit which stands in conflict with a formidable opponent — the very nature of language. After all, language is that which defines by division — by drawing a circle around phenomena in order to have what is from what is not. Therefore, it should be no surprise that these objects the global, humanity often produce discomfort. And, after all, this is a very founded and healthy response. Humanity is not some epistemic story which we can force down upon each other, one which can be had by ignoring all that makes social life interesting — the possibility of encountering the exotic. Oneness is an ontological condition. It is this condition which provides for the disclosure of not only a you, but a me, and the very world itself. The ‘discovery’ of any one is conditioned by that primordial discourse with nature, that wheeling and dealing with nature. This nature includes not only the earth’s elements, but also every phenomenon to which we later attribute consciousness — whether that be animal, man, or machine. The evidence of such pre-intellectual conditioning is the appearance of the very world itself, as it is articulated in each moment of disclosure — since without it, no common activity could be made to effectively contend with it. In as much, we understand our innate disgust for the intellectual story of humanity— from Hegel to the Scandinavian metamodernists. But to give that disgust a more articulate description, we might say that any epistemic story of humanity is only a distraction — one which is overly patronizing. In as much, this story only obscures action toward the real and interesting.

If we can entertain the idea that an idolization of globalization obstructs future modernization, by way of the impotent anxieties following objects such as the global or humanity, then we must also admit that the Scandinavians are not so much wrong in their historicizing, as they are simply bad role models. However, for those who may be on the fence, perhaps on account of the global existential crises of climate change, we can revert to a book written in 1970 — a quite biblical text by E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful. To this day, it remains relevant not only for answering commodification and market economy, but also for addressing the symptoms of industrialization generally. At the height of its influence, this book became a cornerstone of Green Movement literature. There can be no doubt, laying behind the printed words of that text we read of a spirit championing for a complete reversal of episteme. In as much, this article series, How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity, could correctly be billed as something of a sequel — one which is now fifty years overdue. Therefore, it is only fitting that the second half of this work be introduced by repeating a few passages — ones which should be kept in mind as we come closer to prescriptions for economic reform,

“…Instead of overcoming the ‘world’ by moving towards salientness, man tries to overcome it by gaining preeminent wealth, power, science, or indeed any imaginable ‘sport’…He is driven to build up a monster economy and to seek fantastic satisfaction, like landing on the moon…This economy of giantism is a left-over of nineteenth-century conditions and nineteenth-century thinking and it is totally incapable of solving any of the real problems of today.”

“An entirely new system of thought is needed, a system based on attention to people, and not primarily attention to goods…and what was neglected in the nineteenth century is unbelievably urgent now. That is, the conscious utilization of our enormous technological and scientific potential for the fight against misery and human degradation — a fight in intimate contact with actual people, with individuals, families, small groups, rather than states and other anonymous abstractions. This presupposes a political and organizational structure that can provide this intimacy.”

If we now recount what has been gained through the first half of this series, we find a completion of the historical economy of truth. This narrative has taken us from the Roman appropriation of Ancient Greek αληθεια to the industrialized sciences by way of Latin verum. We have also made clear the current project in which truth finds service to an economy of imperium — liberalism’s social governance by way of market economics. At the same time, we have brought into question liberalism’s ability to nurture the safety and security which authenticity demands. What is now required by the second half of this article series is, firstly, an understanding of truth which can ground an infrastructure providing for authenticity. To do so, we must turn toward a foundation beyond doubt, beyond episteme, and beyond knowledge outright.

If we allow ourselves to come back to the ‘less pressing’ issues of the epistemological sociologists, to metaphysics, then we return to the problem which the metamodernists took for granted — that of intersubjective transcendence. In the work of Gadamer, we find words which echo our challenges to liberalism’s position from the omniscient world observer,

“Anyone who takes seriously the finitude of human existence and constructs no ‘consciousness as such’, or ‘intellectus archetypus’, or transcendental ego’, to which everything can be traced back, will not be able to escape the question of how his own thinking as transcendental is empirically possible.”

Here Gadamer appeals to that primordial experience of the world which has been studied under the name phenomenology — a discipline which starts with the very appearance of phenomena and proceeds to understand the conditions for any definitions which follows. It is from the position of this primordial experience which will offer us insights for materializing the prophesies of Small is Beautiful. Only from a phenomenological position can we resolve the feeling that life is becoming more and more complex — and that we require more sophisticated forms of data processing to render this complexity manageable. In the second half of this work we will meet with the aesthetic experience of the beautiful — an aesthetic which presences once we remove the unnecessary and superfluous. A beauty which accompanies simplicity by way of logic’s ability to “release complexity” from the world (Bonnitta Roy) such that affectivity can be animated. A beauty which Schumacher captured in the word small.
Justin Carmien, July 8th, 2020